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The Referendum on Catalan
Self-Determination (Part I)
Endemic Rhetoric, Interpretive Hypocrisy and Legal
Imagination
Dawn of the Living Dead? Self-Determination in (Southern) Europe,
1991 – 2017
Scheduled to  take place on 1  October  2017,  the  referendum on the
independence of Catalonia looks to be a turning point in the history of
the Iberian peninsula;  if  not  a  point  of  no return,  then at  least  the
moment after which the relationship between Catalonia and Spain will
never again be the same. Though it is hard to predict what will happen
on  that  day—the  Spanish  Constitutional  Tribunal  has  declared  the
referendum unconstitutional,  and Spain’s  government  has  vowed to
prevent  it—the legal  developments  that  precede it  are  striking,  not
only  for  the  kind of  constitutional  pluralism inadvertently  ‘inflicted’
upon the Spanish polity (quite unlike that hoped for by its proponents
in constitutional theory, but also for the dramatic resurgence of the
vocabulary of popular self-determination, which, until recently, many
considered all but extinct from the public discourse of Western liberal
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democracies.
Though easy to miss amidst anxious speculations of what comes next
in Catalonia, this resurgence becomes much more apparent once one
compares  the  language  used  in  the  Catalan  Law  on  the  Self-
Determination  Referendum  with  the  rhetorical  devices  used  in
comparable documents elsewhere in Europe over the last decade and a
half.  In  an  unmistakable  contrast  with  the  vocabulary  used  by  the
Montenegrin (2005), Scottish (2013), or Kosovar parliaments (2008)—
none of which ever made a reference to the right to self-determination
of the peoples that elected them as the grounds for the independence
of their polities—the Catalan parliament not only invoked it explicitly,
but did so in a way unheard of in Europe since the summer of 1991.
The kind of vocabulary related to the right to self-determination last
seen  ‘in  action’  in  the  Croatian  and  Slovenian  declarations  of
independence from the federal Yugoslavia in the last days of June of
1991, has recently made a striking appearance in the Catalan Law on
the Self-Determination Referendum. In contrast to allusive references
to  self-determination-sounding  aspirations  which  peppered  the
founding  documents  of  aspiring,  or  newly  independent  states  in
Europe  over  the  last  decade  and  a  half—  the  ‘will  of  the  citizens’
(Montenegro), the ‘will of the people’ (Scotland) or the ‘desires of our
people’  (Kosovo)—the  Catalan  parliament  invoked  self-determination
not as  a  ‘wishy-washy’  moral  aspiration,  but  rather as  a  hard,  non-
negotiable,  and  ‘inalienable’  legal  right,  grounding  it—just  as  the
Slovenians  and  the  Croatians  did  in  1991—in  a  strategically  crafted
hybrid of international legal, constitutional and moral arguments.
Like  the Croatian Diet  in  the summer of  1991—which took pains  to
underscore  the  ‘thirteen  century-long  juridical  tradition  of  the
Croatian people’, ’ever-conscious of its right to independence … as one
of the oldest …historical nations in Europe’, preserved, they insisted,
even during long periods of ‘personal’  and … [other] juridical unions
with other nations’—the 2017 Catalan parliament made sure to remind
the  readers  of  the  ‘explanatory  memorandum’  to  the  Self-
Determination Law of the:
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confluence of the historical legitimacy and legal and
institutional  tradition  of  the  Catalan  people
—interrupted, over the course of the centuries only by
force  of  arms—and  the  right  of  peoples  to  self-
determination, enshrined in international legislation
and  jurisprudence  and  the  principles  of  popular
sovereignty and respect for human rights, as the basis
for all legal systems.
Unlike the documents that paved the way for the secession of Slovenia
and Croatia  from then-Yugoslavia,  however,  the Law of  the Catalan
parliament did not have the luxury of invoking the text of the national
constitution  itself,  which  in  the  Yugoslav  case  explicitly,  albeit
effusively, grounded the legitimacy of that socialist federation in the
right of all Yugoslav nations to self-determination, including secession.
In contrast to the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY)—a document inspired by Leninist policy towards the
solution of the national question in multinational states— article 2 of
the 1978 Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain reveals its indebtedness
to a  different tradition of  political  thought:  the Jacobin tradition of
French republicanism. Instead of the right to self-determination of all
of its ‘nations’, article 2 asserts the indissoluble unity of the Spanish
Nation, ‘the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards’, while
recognizing and guaranteeing ‘the right to self-government’—not self-
determination—to  ‘the  nationalities  and  regions  of  which  it  is
composed and the solidarity among them all’. Like the Croatians (and
Slovenians)  in  1991—and  the  secessionist  states  in  antebellum  US
before them—the 2017 Catalan parliamentarians’ invocation of the right
of their people to self-determination hinges on two assertions which
only a small minority of constitutional and international lawyers—both
in 2017 as well as 26 years ago—would be willing to support without
important extra-juridical qualifications: (1) that it is the organs of their
territorial unit (Slovenia, Croatia, or Catalonia) and not the organs of
the  central  government  (Spain,  Yugoslavia)  which  have  ultimate
interpretive authority when it comes to the meaning of the national
constitution;  and  (2)  that  this  authority  is  actually  supported  by
positive international law.
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Though identical in their bottom line, the right to self-determination
invoked  by  the  Catalan  parliament  was  different  in  one  important
aspect from those of the former Yugoslav republics in 1991. In contrast
to the Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence
of Croatia—which simply took notice of the fact that Yugoslavia ceased
to exist  as a ‘constitutionally and legally ordered state’—the Catalan
parliament  made  sure  to  take  notice  of  the  fact  that  the  Catalan
government made every effort to persuade the Spanish government to
respect the right of the Catalan people to the ‘democratic management
of public affairs’. It is only after ‘exhausting all forms of dialogue and
negotiation with the Spanish State’, did the Catalan parliament decide
to exercise the power which inheres in its ‘inalienable’ right to self-
determination, and to call a referendum on the unilateral secession of
Catalonia. In contrast with the Croatian and Slovenian invocations of
the  international  legal  right  to  ‘external’  self-determination
—interpreted as  belonging to  the peoples  of  the Yugoslav  republics
simpliciter,  with  no  limitations  or  qualifications—the  right  to  self-
determination  which  appears  in  the  discourse  of  the  Catalan
parliament has much stronger overtones of what, since 1991, came to
be known as the ‘remedial’ right to self-determination.
The Secession of Catalonia: A Remedy for What?
How deep are the differences between the Southeastern (1991) and the
Southwestern  European  (2017)  visions  of  the  right  to  self-
determination? On the one hand, the Slovenian, Croatian and Catalan
visions all share the same bottom line: the vision of self-determination
as an inalienable right which belongs to sub-state,  territorially pre-
defined  ‘peoples’,  which  may  be—in  the  final  analysis—exercised
without regard to the provisions of positive constitutional order, or the
opinions of the rest of the wider state’s citizens. On the other hand,
the quarter of a century since the dissolution of Yugoslavia has seen
new legal developments that influenced the Catalan understanding of
the right to self-determination in international law as something that
must be morally justified, not simply asserted. One such development,
as  I’ve  just  mentioned,  has  been  the  increasingly  influential
interpretation of that right as having ‘evolved’ into a remedy for the
failure  of  a  sovereign  state  to  act  in  conformity  with  the  minimal
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standards of political legitimacy.
Had it been only for the increasing prominence of the remedial vision
of self-determination among international  lawyers,  the architects of
the  Catalan  independence  project  might  have  never  mustered
sufficient courage to invoke it as explicitly as they did in the Law on
the  Self-Determination  referendum.  Even  if  one  were  to  accept,
following the reasoning of the Catalan Law on the Self-determination
Referendum, that ‘democratic management of public affairs has been
internationally accepted as one of the cornerstones of contemporary
society—‘inextricably linked to, amongst other rights, that of citizens’
direct and indirect political participation and to the right to freedom
and to human dignity, including freedom of expression and opinion,
freedom  of  thought  and  freedom  of  association’—from  this  it  still
doesn’t  follow  that  the  remedial  conception  of  the  right  to  self-
determination supports the proposition that those rights ought to be
exercised  at  the  level,  manner,  and  with  juridical  consequences
asserted by the Catalan parliament; or, that it is the Catalan parliament
that has the ultimate authority to decide the manner in which those
rights ought to be exercised.
Though a different conclusion suggests itself solely from reading the
text of the Law, Catalan sovereigntists have been keenly aware of this
interpretive hurdle. In fact, when viewed against the backdrop of the
discourse that  dominated Catalan sovereigntist  circles  over  the last
decade, the vocabulary of the legal right to external self-determination
appears as a relatively marginal component, certainly dwarfed by the
notoriously  allusive  dret  a  decidir  (the  right  to  decide)—its  tactical
rhetorical substitute, originally conjured up in the early 2000s not by
Catalan,  but  by  Basque  separatists.  In  the  Catalan  context,  its
rhetorical  function  was  three-fold:  (1)  to  build  support  for  a
referendum among those ambivalent about Catalan independence, (2)
to convey the illegitimacy of the Spanish government’s opposition to a
broader, international audience, and, (3) to do so without raising its
anxiety-levels in the process (something, which the Catalan strategists
rightly presumed as likely to happen in response to explicit references
to the right of self-determination).
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Looking back, it is difficult to say what made the leaders of the Catalan
secessionist movement change their minds, and take their gloves off,
and begin to invoke (or as some would argue, return to) the right to
external  self-determination  as  their  international  legal  entitlement.
While it’s possible that what made them raise the rhetorical ante was,
indeed, their authentic ‘frustration’—the frustration, that is, with the
failure of their ‘final attempt … to guarantee for the people of Catalonia
full recognition, representation and participation in the … life of the
Spanish state without any form of discrimination’—it is highly unlikely
that this frustration alone, without other extraneous encouragements,
would have been powerful enough to push the strategists of Catalan
sovereignty to insist on a claim, which not even the most enthusiastic
supporters  of  the  remedial  right  to  self-determination  among
international lawyers are willing to take for granted.
Rather than incidental to the totality of the Catalan grievances, that
claim is in fact its centerpiece: the assertion that the decision of the
Spanish  Constitutional  Tribunal  to  strike  down  parts  of  the  2006
Statute  of  Autonomy  of  Catalonia  amounts  to  ‘the  breaking  of  the
Spanish constitutional  pact of 1978’.  This claim appears to be highly
dubious:  though  highly  sophisticated  arguments  have  been  made
about why the Constitutional Tribunal acted unconstitutionally in this
case,  the  fact  remains  that  the  text  of  the  Constitution  of  Spain
contains no references to anything that would identify it as the ‘pact’.
To the contrary: as the document ratified by the ‘Spanish people’  is
‘based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common
and indivisible homeland of  all  Spaniards’.  Though the legitimacy of
insisting on the impossibility to transcend this limitations of article 2
other than through constitutional amendment is highly dubious as well
(both prudential, ethically, and juridically) the claim on which Catalans
pin  much  of  their  moral  case  to  secede  is  still  established  on  a
rhetorical trick—which those with a concrete stake in the conflict on
the other side will never be slow to detect: the alleged violation of the
Spanish Constitution presumes the acceptance of something which is
the  very  object  of  constitutional  dispute,  the  institutional  locus  of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz within the Spanish constitutional order.
For our purposes, this is important for another reason. It directs our
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attention towards the jurisprudential development which (beyond an
increasingly influential remedial account of self-determination) played
a role in emboldening the Catalan secessionists to bet on the success
of an argument which failed not only in the United States in 1865 (in
the guise of the theory of state rights) but also in Canada in 1995 (in
the  guise  of  the  compact  theory  of  federation)  and  which  only
superficially assisted the Croatians and Slovenians in their struggle to
secede from an already crumbling Yugoslavia.  Rather than a naively
held belief that the audience won’t notice that the legitimacy of their
righteous protestations hinges on the acceptance of something which
is extremely unlikely—i.e. the notion of a ‘pact’ as the juridical nature of
the Spanish constitution—what seems to have informed the Catalan
juridical  imagination  of  self-determination  were  the  more  recent
constitutional developments in other parts of the world, particularly
those in Canada and the United Kingdom. What these developments
offered, or so it seemed, was a new understanding of the way in which
liberal  democratic constitutional orders (however established) ought
to respond to  the desires  of  determined minorities  to  be governed
differently,  lest  they  want  to  lose  their  domestic  and  international
legitimacy. Confronting the promise of those developments, as well as
their limitations, is the topic of Part II of this short essay.
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